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REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS, PROOF OF FACT AND
AUTHOR PRIVACY IN COPYRIGHT LAW: A HISTORY 
AND A CONCERN
ELIZABETH ADENEY*
Recent judgments in Australia have called for author identifi cation in 
order that copyright subsistence may be established. There is a risk that 
such calls will be taken too literally, to the detriment of author privacy. 
This article considers the legal mechanisms by which author identity has 
historically been shielded from disclosure, without the operation of the 
copyright system being impaired. It expresses the hope that those who are 
responsible for developing copyright law will be mindful of the concern 
for author privacy which has long been part of copyright discourse.
I  INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, a number of Australian cases have discussed the requirements 
that form the essential foundation for an action for copyright infringement. It 
has been emphasised by the High Court that the author is central to the system 
of copyright protection in this country and that authorship must be proved 
by the person claiming copyright. In some decisions it has also been asserted 
that the author must be ‘identifi ed’. If this assertion were to be taken to denote 
identifi cation by name, or identifi cation in a way that a name might be ascertained, 
and if it were taken as a general proposition of copyright law, it would become 
problematic. It would come into apparent confl ict with a number of mechanisms, 
both international and domestic, which have for more than a century both allowed 
author identity to be obscured and enabled economic aspects of the copyright 
system to operate in the absence of author identifi cation. Such absence of 
identifi cation may result from the loss of knowledge of the author’s identity; or it 
may be caused by the author preferring his or her privacy to be maintained.
Any call by judges for author identifi cation needs to be looked at against this 
complex of mechanisms. Legislative provisions embodying them range from 
provisions which grant rights (for example moral rights) to those which establish 
statutory presumptions, or lay the groundwork for representative actions, or 
establish copyright duration. The intentions underlying these provisions need to 
be taken into consideration. The importance of author choice on the question of 
identifi cation should not be forgotten.
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Part II of this article gives a summary of the recent cases. Part III considers 
the legislative mechanisms which are capable of protecting author privacy, and 
particularly the mechanism of the statutory presumption. Part IV looks at the 
history of these statutory presumptions, in an effort to determine what they say 
or imply about the need for author identifi cation. Part V of the article considers 
some of the recent Australian decisions against this background.
II  RECENT CASES: THE STATED NEED FOR IDENTIFICATION 
It should be stated at the outset that the recent discussion of author identifi cation 
has taken place in commercial contexts and in cases where individual authors 
were not themselves seeking to remain unknown. Either the ‘works’ for which 
copyright was claimed were put together by unnamed employees of a corporation, 
were computer-generated, or were the serial productions of a number of small 
scale and unidentifi ed contributors. Productions of this kind raise diffi cult issues 
for copyright law, which need to be addressed. It is not the purpose of this article, 
however, to discuss the problems of corporate production, nor to suggest how the 
courts or the legislature should deal with it.
The purpose here is rather to consider the consistency of the recent discussion 
with the legislative history and to note the danger of pronouncements made 
in some decisions spilling over into other copyright judgments and impacting 
upon the prerogatives of individual authors. The danger is that certain judicial 
pronouncements may skew the copyright system in ways that were not intended 
by the judges making them. In particular they could impact on author privacy.
A  The Cases, the Statements
The question faced by the courts in the cluster of recent cases has been whether 
the existence of original copyright material could be proved without author 
identifi cation. And, if it could not be so proved, what form that identifi cation 
should take. The discussion began with Telstra Corporation Ltd v Desktop 
Marketing Systems Pty Ltd,1 which was decided in the plaintiff’s favour 
without any kind of identifi cation of authors, despite the judge at fi rst instance, 
Finkelstein J, intimating that the question of authorship might need to be more 
thoroughly addressed in future litigation.2
1 (2001)  181 ALR 134. 
2 Ibid 136 [4]: 
 Must a copyright work have an author? … Does a telephone directory have an author? … Is
every employee who contributes to the fi nal product a joint author of the directory? These 
are diffi cult questions for which there are no ready answers … the case was contested on the
apparent assumption that it was either unnecessary for Telstra to establish that a telephone
directory has an author, or that those involved in its preparation are joint authors. I will proceed 
as if these assumptions are correct. But they may not be.
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Eight years later, the High Court considered the case of IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine 
Network Australia Pty Ltd,3 concerning the time and title information contained 
in a Weekly Schedule produced by a television network (the Nine Network), in 
which it claimed copyright. In that case, French CJ and Crennan and Kiefel JJ 
noted the lack of any information about the identity of the material’s (presumably 
joint) authors, but did not consider that their judgment was hampered by it, 
since the defendant had admitted copyright subsistence.4 The other three judges
(Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) indicated in dicta that joint authorship could 
not be proved where a joint author was unknown.5
The latter judges, in a much quoted statement, also placed weight on the failure to 
provide details of author identity:
To proceed without identifying the work in suit and without informing the 
inquiry by identifying the author and the relevant time of making or fi rst 
publication, may cause the formulation of the issues presented to the court 
to go awry.6
These members of the bench did not indicate whether the ‘identifi cation’ of the 
author that they had in mind should be by name; however this would be the most 
usual form of identifi cation. The statement has been cited repeatedly in later 
decisions, several of which emphasised at varying levels of sophistication the 
need for author identifi cation.
In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd,7 a case which
concerned copyright in the yellow and white pages of a telephone directory, the 
applicant wished to rely on the nature of the work itself rather than the identity 
of the authors in order to establish copyright subsistence under s 32(2) of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The argument was that if an ‘original work’ existed, 
then authorship must by defi nition have taken place, and publication of the work 
would then give rise to copyright protection under s 32(2)(c). The applicant did 
not accept that it needed to identify authors as individuals in order to establish 
the copyright. 
Gordon J at fi rst instance considered this stance problematic where material had 
been produced jointly, and indeed it is in the area of joint authorship that the 
matter becomes particularly diffi cult. Even if it could be established that, on 
balance, the ‘works’ raised an inference of suffi cient intellectual effort having 
been applied to satisfy the originality requirement, it could not be proved that 
a particular author or particular authors had contributed this effort. Since joint 
authorship does not arise unless each joint author has collaboratively, and as part 
3 (2009) 239 CLR 458 (‘IceTV’).
4 Ibid 470 [21], [23].
5 Ibid 507 [151].
6 Ibid 496 [105].
7 (2010) 264 ALR 617 (‘Phone Directories’).
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of a concerted effort, contributed intellectual effort to a production,8 and since 
it was unknown who the possible joint authors were, the judge considered that 
joint authorship could not be established. Without joint authorship, the claimed 
copyright material would, at best, collapse into multiple tiny works by individual 
authors or, at worst, into nothing that could be called a work at all. Therefore 
the identifi cation of the authors was stated to be essential to the argument that 
copyright works in the form of whole phone directories had been produced.
In this instance it seemed that such identifi cation was envisaged as a naming of 
the authors. Gordon J stated that:
for a work to be suffi ciently original for the subsistence of copyright,
‘substantial labour’ and/or ‘substantial expense’ is not alone suffi cient.
More is required. What that more is will, of course, vary from case to case
but must involve ‘originality’ by an identifi ed author in an identifi ed work.9
Lists of names were in fact prepared by the plaintiff in this case, though their 
accuracy was rejected by Gordon J.10
In a further case, Primary Health Care Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
— concerning copyright in a series of notes contributed to patient records by a 
succession of medical practitioners — Stone J stated:
it is not suffi cient, and in many cases it is probably not possible, to establish
that a work is an original product of independent intellectual effort without 
identifying the author.11
Her Honour evidently had in mind the naming and description of the various 
persons who had contributed to the records. Her Honour rejected the idea that the 
authorship of a work of this kind could be inferred from the nature of the work 
itself.12
Subsequently, in the case of Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed 
International Books Australia Pty Ltd — which concerned either: (1) each 
individual headline in a newspaper, or (2) each article including its headline, or 
(3) the compilation of articles, including headlines, in each newspaper edition, or 
(4) each entire edition — Bennett J commented, drawing again on the High Court 
decision in IceTV, that ‘[a] requirement for originality is that the work originates 
8 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) (defi nition of ‘work of joint authorship’). Section 10(1) was
discussed in IceTV (2009) 239 CLR 458, 470 [23]:
 A ‘work of joint authorship’, as recognised under the Act, requires that the literary work in 
question ‘has been produced by the collaboration of two or more authors and in which the 
contribution of each author is not separate from the contribution of the other author or the 
contributions of the other authors’.
9 Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 624 [20] (emphasis added).
10 Ibid 683–4 [333]–[338].
11 (2010) 186 FCR 301, 312 [37] (‘Primary Health Care’).
12 Ibid 312 [34] (Stone J), quoting (with apparent approval) Gordon J’s statement in Phone Directories 
(2010) 264 ALR 617, 628 [35] that ‘[t]o suggest that copyright does not require the identifi cation of 
authors where a work is suffi ciently original (howsoever that question of originality is to be answered) 
puts the cart before the horse’.
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from the author as opposed to being copied. It is therefore important to identify 
the author of the work in which copyright is said to exist’.13
Bennett J’s comments, and those which preceded them, were expressed suffi ciently 
broadly to seem to be calling for a naming of the author. 
While there was no indication in these cases that any of the authors would have 
desired to remain unnamed, there was a real possibility that the comments would 
be applied generally as stating standard requirements for the establishment of 
originality either for subsistence or infringement purposes. This was particularly 
the case in Phone Directories, where Gordon J appeared to be stating, in general 
terms, a checklist of the requirements for establishing copyright:
You must identify authors, and those authors must direct their contribution 
… to the particular form of expression of the work. Start with the work. 
Find its authors. They must have done something, howsoever defi ned, that 
can be considered original.14
To be fair, however, her Honour had previously stated that 
it is important to note the distinction between identifying an author or 
authors of the original work and the identity of the author or authors 
of the original work … If an author or authors (within the meaning of 
the Copyright Act) cannot be identifi ed at all, in contradistinction to a 
situation where the author’s or authors’ exact identity cannot be identifi ed, 
copyright cannot subsist.15
This statement sits uneasily beside the blunt instruction to ‘[f]ind its authors’.16
If it means that the authors need not actually be identifi ed in court, then it may 
represent a welcome moderation of the more extreme assertions made elsewhere 
in the cases. Gordon J’s stance was subsequently given the latter, more moderate 
interpretation by two judges of the Full Federal Court on appeal, as will be 
discussed further in Part V below.
III  COUNTER INDICATIONS TO THE CALL FOR
IDENTIFICATION
It was mentioned above that our legislation contains provisions which seem 
to work against the requirement of author identifi cation in various ways. 
Some legislative provisions create rights that actively protect the author from 
unwanted disclosures. Other provisions allow the copyright system to operate (in 
13 (2010) 189 FCR 109, 127 [71] (‘Fairfax v Reed’).
14 Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 685 [344] (emphasis added). On appeal, Yates J expressly 
approved this statement, saying that the primary judge had ‘correctly identifi ed the relevant chain of 
inquiry’: Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd (2010) 194 FCR 142, 182 [133]. He
was, however, not joined in this by the other two judges. See below Part V.
15 Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 630 [37] (emphasis in original).
16 Ibid 685 [344].
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most circumstances) without author identifi cation. These provisions have been 
recognised as being available to an author who wishes to maintain privacy, and 
some have been discussed in the recent Australian decisions. It is instructive to 
identify them and consider why they have been adopted.
A  Moral Rights
The moral rights of the author, present in the Australian copyright legislation 
since 2000, engage with the question of author identifi cation. The moral right of 
attribution of authorship does so most obviously. Although this right is primarily 
concerned with the revelation of author identity, it also taps into much older 
trends in author-protection — namely the same tolerance of authorial masking 
that led to the special treatment of anonymous or pseudonymous works in relation 
to copyright duration.17 Under the attribution right in Australia the author has 
the express right to choose the form of designation to be used, and can therefore 
choose a pseudonym.18 In some countries the author is expressly permitted to
opt for anonymity.19 Once a pseudonym is chosen, the author’s ‘true’ identity is
masked in those contexts that are most likely to reveal that identity. Nobody may 
reproduce the work, publish it, perform it, adapt it or communicate it to the public 
under any name other than the pseudonym, even the true name of the author.20
However, any right to pseudonymity (or any tolerance of pseudonymity or 
anonymity in cases where moral rights do not exist) will protect privacy effectively 
only if the rest of the Act will accommodate such protection. Privacy is effectively 
protected only if the commercial interests of the copyright owner, be that person 
the author or not, can be asserted in court without the author being named or 
otherwise identifi ed. To this end, further procedural mechanisms are needed.
B  Mechanisms that Mitigate the Need for Author 
Identifi cation
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) both tolerates and facilitates the withholding of 
information that would identify the author. For example, the masking, erasing 
or losing of information going to author identity does not prevent the copyright 
17 This special treatment dates back at least to 1870 in Germany and to the Copyright Act 1956, 4 & 
5 Eliz 2, c 74 sch 2 in the UK. In Australia it dates back to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). In the 
Berne Convention, the fi rst fully developed treatment of this kind originated in art 7(4) of the Brussels 
Act which revised earlier versions of the Berne Convention: Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature 26 June 1948, 331 UNTS 217 (entered into force 1 
August 1951) art 7(4). Prior to that, the term of protection of anonymous and pseudonymous works was 
governed, under art 7(3) of the Berne Convention, either by the country where protection was sought 
or that where the work originated: Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
opened for signature 9 September 1886, [1901] ATS 126 (entered into force 5 December 1887).
18 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 195. The right to choose a form of designation is given on the proviso that 
the designation chosen is a reasonable one.
19 See, eg, Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, s 14.1(1); Urheberrechtsgesetz [Copyright Law] (Germany) 
§13.  
20 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 193–4.
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owner from exploiting the work and may not greatly impact upon the value of 
the work as a commodity in economic life. In these circumstances, under s 34 
of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), the copyright term will be calculated from the 
date of publication rather than the death of the author, but the copyright otherwise 
remains unaffected.
Mechanisms are also in place to allow litigation to be commenced despite lack 
of authorial designation. Chief among these are the ‘proof of fact’ provisions 
or statutory presumptions. A provision of this type allows presumptions (as to 
authorship and nationality, for example) to be made where the author’s name is 
unknown to the court. Proof of authorship by a specifi ed person does not need 
to be established in order for an action to be mounted. Such procedural devices 
are contained in ss 128 and 129 of the Australian Act, but devices of this kind 
came to the fore long ago, at the point in history when the practice of registration 
of copyright works was in decline. In the absence of an entry in the register, 
provisions of this kind were needed to provide a legal platform from which an 
action for copyright infringement could be launched.21
In association with these general proof of fact provisions, express provision has 
long been made, internationally and sometimes domestically, to establish who 
can protect the ‘author’s rights’22 in an anonymously or pseudonymously authored 
work. The current text of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (‘Berne Convention’), for example, provides that, in the case of 
anonymous and pseudonymous works, the publisher will be deemed to represent 
the author in any action to protect the author’s rights.23 Thus the possibility of 
representative actions has been established.
IV  HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE STATUTORY 
PRESUMPTIONS
To understand our current statutory presumptions it is necessary to look at 
the history and purposes underlying provisions which allow actions related to 
the work of an unidentifi ed author. Such provisions were intended to facilitate 
commercial transactions and to protect the interests of a copyright holder. 
However, the history of the provisions also indicates a concern for the author as a 
person, and this should be remembered when the descendants of these provisions 
are construed by the courts.
21 See below n 46.
22 And this term is compendious, embracing both the economic and the moral rights.
23 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature 9 September 
1886, [1901] ATS 126 (entered into force 5 December 1887), as last revised by the Paris Act relating 
to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed 24 July 1971, 1161 
UNTS 30 (entered into force 15 December 1972), and further amended by the Amendments to Articles 
22 and 23 of the Paris Act of 14 July 1971 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, signed 28 September 1979, [1984] ATS 40 (entered into force 19 November 1984) art 15.
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A  Before Berne
One of the fi rst ‘proof of fact’ provisions, and one which infl uenced the drafting 
of the Berne Convention, was present in the German law of 1870. The German 
statute provided for representative actions as well as inserting a further device 
to obviate the need for author identifi cation. The anonymous or pseudonymous 
author’s rights could be enforced by a third party, and the publisher was nominated 
as the author’s successor in title. Under the statute:
In the case of anonymous and pseudonymous works, the editor and, if no
indication of editorship is given, the publisher, is entitled to enforce the
author’s rights. 
The publisher whose name appears on the work is deemed, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, to be the successor in title to the anonymous or 
pseudonymous author.24
There was a specifi c reason for this nomination of the publisher as a ‘successor in 
title’ rather than merely as a representative. The last paragraph was explained at 
the time by a leading commentator as follows:
Only in the case of anonymous and pseudonymous works must the
publisher be regarded as the successor in title to the author in the absence
of any information to the contrary. Otherwise the author would be forced 
to step out of his anonymity in order to pursue his rights.25
The deemed transfer of title to the publisher meant that, for legal purposes, only 
the publisher needed to deal with the courts and would not need to prove the 
transfer of title from the author. Thus, the author’s anonymity would be preserved 
if the publisher were to take action to defend the author’s rights and presumably 
also the publisher’s own rights. While in most cases the publisher would have 
known full well the identity of the author, the German statute removed any 
necessity to divulge it.
The price paid by the author who did not want to be identifi ed was a shorter 
period of protection — 30 years from fi rst publication rather than 30 years from 
the author’s death.26 In order to avoid the penalty, the identity of the author could 
subsequently be divulged for the purposes of registration. This could be done 
24 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, Abbildungen, musikalischen Kompositionen und 
dramatischen Werken vom 11 Juni 1870 [Law Relating to the Copyright in Literary Works, Visual 
Images, Musical Compositions and Dramatic Works of 11 June 1870] (Germany) § 28 [author’s trans]. 
25 Robert Fischer, Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, Abbildungen, musikalischen 
Kompositionen und dramatischen Werken vom 11 Juni 1870 [Law Relating to the Copyright in Literary 
Works, Visual Images, Musical Compositions and Dramatic Works of 11 June 1870] (Griesbach, 1870).
26 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, Abbildungen, musikalischen Kompositionen und 
dramatischen Werken vom 11 Juni 1870 [Law Relating to the Copyright in Literary Works, Visual 
Images, Musical Compositions and Dramatic Works of 11 June 1870] (Germany) § 11 sentence 3 
[author’s trans].
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only, however, by the author or by those successors in title who were authorised 
to do so, not by the copyright owner of his own volition.27
This provision was infl uential. The idea of the ‘proof of fact’ provision was taken 
up in the negotiations which led to the drafting of the Berne Convention during 
the 1880s,28 negotiations in which the German delegates were very active. These
negotiations throw further light on the assumptions upon which the drafting of 
the provisions was based.
B  The Berne Convention
As indicated by the negotiators, the proof of fact provisions in the Berne Convention
were a response to the fact that many countries had dispensed with registration 
systems by this stage.29 It was thought desirable to insert into the Convention a
clause which would facilitate cross border infringement action by removing from 
the plaintiff the initial need formally to justify the claim to copyright. 
1  Early Drafting
The relevant article of the Berne Convention was formulated in 1884 (three years 
before the fi nalisation of the fi rst Convention text) as follows:
To ensure that all works of literature or of art receive the protection laid 
down in article 2, and so that the authors of the said works should, unless 
the contrary is proved, be considered as such and therefore permitted 
to take action for copyright infringement in the tribunals of the various 
countries of the Union, it shall be suffi cient that their name be indicated 
on the title page of the work, below the dedication or the preface or at the 
end of the work.
For anonymous or pseudonymous works, the publisher whose name is 
indicated on the work is entitled to protect the author’s rights. He is, in 
the absence of proof to the contrary, deemed to be the assignee of the 
anonymous or pseudonymous author.30
27 Ibid § 11 sentence 4: ‘If, within a period of 30 years from fi rst publication, the true name of the author 
is reported — by the author himself or by his successors in title who are authorised to do so — for the
purposes of entry in the Register, the work will receive the longer period of protection provided for in § 
8’ [author’s trans].
28 The negotiations took place in Berne in September 1884 and 1885. 
29 See Actes de la conférence internationale pour la protection des droits d’auteur réunie à Berne du 8 au 
19 septembre 1884 [Proceedings of the International Conference for the Protection of Authors’ Rights
held in Berne from 8 to 19 September 1884] (1884) 36, 56 [author’s trans].
30 Ibid 56 (emphasis added).
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The similarities with the 1870 German legislation were obvious. Even the 
indication of where the name needed to appear on the work was taken partly from 
that source.31
The draft article (art 12 at that time) was discussed the following year. During 
that discussion the article was described as ‘procedural’ and as not competing 
with any domestic registration requirements in the work’s country of origin.32
The provision became art 11 of the proposed Berne Convention text.33
At this stage it had been asked by an unnamed delegate whether the second 
sentence of paragraph 2 — ‘[The publisher] is, in the absence of proof to the 
contrary, deemed to be the assignee of the anonymous or pseudonymous author’ 
— should be removed, since it appeared to him otiose.34 However it was explained 
that the sentence was far from superfl uous, as would have been clear to any person 
familiar with the German statute. It existed, it was explained, so that both the 
author and the publisher could receive protection, without the author’s true name 
needing to be revealed.35 If the author’s rights had been violated the publisher 
could defend them in court without revealing the identity of the author. This 
arose from the fi rst sentence of the paragraph. But if the publisher’s rights had 
been violated (and at this stage certain publishers were expressly protected by the 
Berne Convention)36 the danger arose that, in order to make good his own rights, 
the publisher would have to reveal the name of the author, since it was from the 
author that the publisher had derived his title. In order for this kind of disclosure 
not to be necessary, the sentence had been drafted in a way that deemed the 
publisher to be the assignee of the anonymous or pseudonymous author and hence 
as asserting his own rights:
If this article is removed, the publisher (éditeur) is obliged, in case of 
legal action, to prove that his right comes to him in a proper way from the
author. He can do this by producing his contract with the author or in some
other way, but in any event the name of the author is revealed, which is
undesirable ( fâcheux).37
31 Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Schriftwerken, Abbildungen, musikalischen Kompositionen und 
dramatischen Werken vom 11 Juni 1870 [Law Relating to the Copyright in Literary Works, Visual 
Images, Musical Compositions and Dramatic Works of 11 June 1870] (Germany) s 11: ‘on the title page 
or under the dedication or under the preface’ [author’s trans].
32 Actes de la 2me conférence internationale pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques réunie 
à Berne du 7 au 18 Septembre 1885 [Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works held in Berne from 7 to 18 September 1885] (1885) 50 [author’s trans]. 
33 Ibid 50−1.
34 Ibid 50.
35 Actes de la conférence internationale pour la protection des droits d’auteur réunie à Berne du 8 au 19 
septembre 1884 [Proceedings of the International Conference for the Protection of Authors’ Rights held 
in Berne from 8 to 19 September 1884] (1884) 78 [author’s trans].
36 In art 3 of the Draft Convention adopted by the 1884 Conference it was stated that the provisions 
applying to authors applied equally to publishers (éditeurs) of works published within the Union but 
whose authors did not belong to a Union state: ibid 78.
37 Actes de la 2me conférence internationale pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques réunie 
à Berne du 7 au 18 Septembre 1885 [Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works held in Berne from 7 to 18 September 1885] (1885) 50 [author’s trans].
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Subsequently, a few alterations were made to the Convention text prior to it being
signed. The words ‘on the title page of the work, below the dedication or the 
preface or at the end of the work’ were replaced by the more compendious phrase 
‘in the usual manner’ (‘en la manière usitée’).38 Otherwise the provision was as 
planned.
2  Berlin to Brussels
The next opportunity to consider the provision came at the Berlin conference 
in 1910 when the provision became art 15. It was reiterated in Berlin that ‘[i]t is 
desirable that the author’s rights can be protected without him being obliged to 
indicate his true name’.39
No signifi cant discussion of the provision took place at the following revision 
conference in Rome in 1928, a conference which, however, moved the Berne 
Convention onto a more unambiguously pro-author footing through the insertion 
of the inalienable moral rights. It was not until the Brussels conference after the 
Second World War that the provision was altered at the instigation of the French 
delegation. This alteration, which was possibly misconceived, removed the last 
sentence from the formulation — that sentence which had earlier been stated to 
obviate the need for author identifi cation in the case of a publisher’s action for 
infringement. (At this stage the Berne Convention was no longer expressed to 
protect publishers’ rights expressly, nor to assimilate the rights of a successor in 
title to the author’s rights).40 In relation to the ‘anonymity’ paragraph the French 
delegation stated, inter alia:
The idea of the representation of the author by the publisher seems to the 
French government legally more precise than the notion of the assignee of 
the author which is contained in the present text. … While maintaining its 
original position on matters of principle, the French government therefore 
proposes the following text:
For anonymous works, and for pseudonymous works other than
those which were mentioned in the previous paragraph, the
publisher whose name is indicated on the work is, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, presumed to represent the author. He is in this
capacity entitled to protect and assert the rights of the said author.
The arrangements contained in the present paragraph cease to be
38 Ibid 76. 
39 Actes de la conférence de l’Union internationale pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques
réunie à Berlin du 14 octobre au 14 novembre 1908 [Proceedings of the International Union for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works held in Berlin from 14 October to 14 November 1908] (Bureau 
de l’Union Internationale pour la Protection des Œuvres Littéraires et Artistiques, 1910) 266 (emphasis
added) [author’s trans].
40 This was in contrast to arts 3 and 5 of the 1884 text: see above n 35.
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applicable when the author has revealed his identity and established 
the capacity in which he acts.41
Thus, the author’s anonymity would be maintained in a representative action, but 
no clear guidance was now given in respect of a situation where the publisher or 
another person might want to protect their own rights. The proposed provision 
was adopted, effectively without discussion.
It is unclear here whether the delegation members had missed the point of 
the earlier wording, or whether they considered it unnecessary, given that the 
Convention did not expressly assimilate the rights of a successor in title to the 
authors’ rights. It seems unlikely that this delegation would have intended to 
undermine the protection of authorial anonymity, since the French nation had 
always been enthusiastic in its protection of the author as a person.
3  The Present Berne Text
Subsequently, the provision assimilating the assignee’s rights to the author’s rights 
was reinstated (except where moral rights were concerned), so that assignees 
would be taking action in their own name.42 Nevertheless, the French wording of 
the anonymity provision has been retained, leaving unaddressed the legal position 
of the author where an assignee (or indeed any other copyright owner, such as an 
employer) needs to establish the origin of his or her own title to the work. Must 
the author be identifi ed by name or not? The spirit and the history of the Berne 
Convention would generally indicate that this should not be necessary.43
The current text reads:
In the case of anonymous and pseudonymous works, other than those
referred to in paragraph (1) above, the publisher whose name appears
on the work shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to
represent the author, and in this capacity he shall be entitled to protect and 
enforce the author’s rights. The provisions of this paragraph shall cease
to apply when the author reveals his identity and establishes his claim to
authorship of the work.44
It is notable here that, in line with earlier thinking, the step out of anonymity 
appears to be entirely the prerogative of the author. No indication is given 
41 Documents de la conférence de Bruxelles 5–26 juin 1948 [Records of the Brussels Conference from
5 to 26 June 1948] (Bureau de l’Union Internationale pour la Protection des Œuvres Littéraires et 
Artistiques, Berne, 1951) 369–70.
42 Berne Convention art 2(6).
43 Delegates at the Stockholm revision conference addressed a cluster of further issues — among them 
how the case of an anonymously authored unpublished work (the delegates had in mind a work of 
folklore) should be dealt with. As a result the Member States are now obliged by art 15(4) to nominate 
an authority to represent the author in litigation in Union countries. Such protection cannot be contingent 
on the identifi cation of the author. Indeed a distinction appears to be drawn in the Convention between 
the ‘anonymous’ and the ‘unknown’ author, the former term suggesting a chosen anonymity and the
latter a more impenetrable obscurity.
44 Berne Convention art 15(3).
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that it could be imposed by a court. Likewise the initial choice of anonymity 
or pseudonymity appears to be conceived of as an author’s choice. These are 
not simply cases of the author being unidentifi able to the world at large through 
some historical accident. It would be extraordinary if, for example, the publisher 
mentioned in art 15(3) of the Berne Convention did not know the ‘true’ identity of 
the author; such knowledge does not bar the maintenance of the anonymity under 
the Berne Convention.
These observations have relevance to the recent judgments.
C  Another History: Developments in the United Kingdom
During the 20th century, a form of ‘proof of fact’ provision was introduced into 
the English law of 1911 and hence into Australian law through the operation of 
the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth). In both countries, decades before either introduced 
moral rights provisions, arrangements were made to allow litigation to be initiated 
to protect the rights of the copyright owner (though not necessarily the author) of 
anonymous and pseudonymous works. These countries were obliged to provide 
such protection in order to give foreign stakeholders something like the level 
of protection that they enjoyed under the statutes of their home countries. The 
provisions facilitated the author’s choice of anonymity, but how far the UK and 
Australian Acts went in the preservation of the author’s privacy is open to debate.
1  The Copyright Act 1911
The United Kingdom delegation at the Berne revision conferences was never 
enthusiastic about the proposals for presumptions of the kind discussed there and 
generally remained aloof from the discussion.45 Nevertheless, in its Copyright Act 
1911 the UK, having dispensed with the requirement of registration,46 did provide 
for presumptions of a kind, and echoes of the Berne Convention can be heard in 
the wording of s 6(3)(b) which states:
if no name is … printed or indicated [on the work in the usual manner], 
or if the name so printed or indicated is not the author’s true name or the 
name by which he is commonly known, and a name purporting to be that 
of the publisher or proprietor of the work is printed or otherwise indicated 
thereon in the usual manner, the person whose name is so printed or 
indicated shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be the owner 
45 See comment by the British delegate, Mr Bergue in Actes de la 2me conférence internationale pour la 
protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques réunie à Berne du 7 au 18 Septembre 1885 [Proceedings 
of the 2nd International Conference for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works held in Berne from 
7 to 18 September 1885] 35 [author’s trans].
46 MacGillivray observes in relation to the presumptions: ‘This provision becomes necessary by reason of 
the abolition of registration and of the prima facie proof of copyright which the certifi cate of registration 
now affords’: E J MacGillivray, Copyright Act, 1911, Annotated (Stevens and Sons, 1912) 80 (emphasis 
in original).
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of the copyright in the work for the purposes of proceedings in respect of 
the infringement of copyright therein.47
The focus here was on copyright ownership and the provision was concerned 
solely with the provisional validation of outward appearances for litigation 
purposes. The emphasis of the presumptions was markedly different from that 
of the Berne Convention, and the concept of a representative action on behalf of 
the unnamed author was entirely missing. It would appear that it was impossible 
for an anonymous author/copyright owner to assert rights while maintaining the 
mask; only a non-author could do that.
On the other hand, the functioning of the provision did not appear to require 
the naming of the author by his or her ‘real’ name. MacGillivray, writing on the 
provision in 1912 in a leading commentary, noted that the crucial relationship was 
between the designation on the work and the plaintiff or his assignor:
the author’s name may be a nom de plume by which he is commonly
known qua author. It will not matter that, in private life, he is known by
his true name. All that will be necessary will be to call evidence to prove
the identity of the plaintiff or his assignor, as the case may be, with the
name which is indicated on the work.48
Of course the litigating publisher or proprietor would almost certainly have 
known the identity of the author.49 This must have been assumed by the legislators 
given the widespread use of pseudonyms on published works in the 19th century.50
Since the provision dealt only with the outward or superfi cial masking of identity 
(through the author’s true name not being indicated on the work), the author need 
not be ‘unknown’ in any more profound sense in order for the presumption to be 
relied on.
MacGillivray did not suggest that the tribunal should closely examine the 
relationship between the author and ‘proprietor’. On the other hand he did warn 
against certain types of sharp dealing by the plaintiff:
it would seem that evidence under this section cannot be manufactured for 
the purpose of the trial, and that the prima facie proof afforded by putting
in a copy of the work with the author’s name indicated thereon would be
rebutted by the defendant showing that the name had been put on solely for 
the purpose of the litigation. The author’s name must be indicated in the
usual manner, and that would seem to imply that it must have been put on
at or about the time the work or the copy thereof in question was made.51
47 Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo 5, c 46, s 6(3). See also MacGillivray, above n 46, 80.
48 MacGillivray, above n 46, 81 (emphasis in original).
49 The same point could be made of the equivalent provision in Berne, as evidenced by the delegates’ 
references to a contract subsisting between the publisher and the anonymous author. See above n 34.
50 For example the pseudonyms George Sand, Currer, Ellis and Acton Bell, the ‘Author of Waverley’ and 
George Eliot.
51 MacGillivray, above n 46, 80–1 (emphasis in original).
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The Berne Convention drafters, who had initiated the reference to the ‘usual 
manner’, may not have had in mind its capacity to protect against unconscientious 
dealings by litigators.52 But, although MacGillivray’s comment was based 
on specifi c wording in the text, it reminds us that legislation is unlikely to be 
interpreted in a way that rewards sharp practice — for example an employer’s 
practice of deliberately removing or suppressing the name of the author or failing 
to make attribution in circumstances where attribution could well be made — in 
the expectation that the presumption could therefore be relied on by itself.
At this stage no thought had been given to an anonymous unpublished work nor 
was any express presumption of originality made. This provision constituted the 
law in Australia on ‘proof of facts’ until 1969, when the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
came into force.
2  The Copyright Act 1956
In 1956, the ‘proof of fact’ provision in the UK was expanded.53 The section — in
its express presumption of copyright subsistence54 — appeared to have shifted 
closer to provisional validation of the copyright itself, though this may already 
have been implicit in 1911. And for the fi rst time the originality of the work was 
expressed as a matter to which the presumptions applied.55
Again, no provision was made for the rights of the unnamed author to be asserted 
by a representative. Therefore, serious impediments remained to the author’s own 
enjoyment of rights. 
Under the 1956 Act, the presumption of originality and the presumptions 
concerning the date and time of publication applied where:
• a work was published anonymously or under what was claimed by the 
plaintiff as a pseudonym, and 
• it was ‘not shown that the work [had] ever been published under the true 
name of the author, or under a name by which he was commonly known’, nor 
shown that it was ‘possible for a person without previous knowledge of the 
facts to ascertain the identity of the author by reasonable inquiry’.56
The question of who must ‘show’ (hence presumably prove on the balance of 
probabilities) the relevant facts is left open, but one would assume that it would be 
the person who did not wish the presumption to apply, hence the defendant. As for 
the term ‘commonly known’, such a requirement seemed to refer to the general 
knowledge of the public. Whether the public at large was envisaged, or merely a 
relevant segment of the public, is unclear. 
52 The term seems to have been intended as a conveniently compendious term which circumvented the 
need to specify all the positions in the printed copy which an authorial designation might normally 
occupy.
53 Copyright Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz 2, c 74, s 20. 
54 Ibid s 20(1).
55 Ibid s 20(6).
56 Ibid (emphasis added).
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The reference to ‘a person without previous knowledge of the facts’ seems to 
exclude a party to the publication relationship and a person intimate with the 
author, since they could be supposed to have that previous knowledge. The 
author’s employer would also fall outside the category if the work had been 
produced within the employment relationship. An assignee of the author would 
also, in most cases, be excluded. The fact that the class of persons was narrowed 
to those without previous knowledge of the facts and therefore beyond the author’s 
immediate circle meant that the provision had some real scope for operation. 
An author who did not want to be identifi ed could expect the provision to help 
maintain his or her privacy.
As for the term ‘reasonable inquiry’, what is considered ‘reasonable’ must change 
over time, as technologies develop. However, one might assume that the hiring 
of a private investigator to make inquiries would fall on the unreasonable side of 
the line.
3  The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK)
The current law in the UK appears to represent a rethinking of the ‘proof of fact’ 
provision and does nothing to enhance an author’s privacy. Where the author is 
unknown, s 104(5) applies:
If the author … cannot be ascertained by reasonable inquiry, it shall be
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary —
(a)  that the work is an original work, and
(b)  that the plaintiff’s allegations as to what was the fi rst publication 
of the work and as to the country of fi rst publication are correct.57
As in the 1956 Act, originality is expressly made the subject of the presumption. 
But the legislature has worded the subsection so that it applies to a narrower set of 
circumstances than the 1956 Act. The terms ‘anonymous’ and ‘pseudonymous’, 
suggestive of an author’s choices, have been dropped in favour of the much 
narrower concept of unascertainable identity. This would appear to indicate that 
the author’s prerogative of choosing anonymity or pseudonymity is no longer to 
be given particular protection under the statute. If that is the case, the provision 
sits very uncomfortably with the moral rights of the author that were introduced 
by this very Act.58 Under the UK right of attribution, the author has the right to 
choose the designation under which he or she wishes to be known, that is, to 
choose a pseudonym.59 It would be curious if that choice (which is unlikely to lead 
to unascertainable identity) were not supported by the statutory presumptions.
The passive construction ‘cannot be ascertained by reasonable inquiry’ is not 
linked to any particular subject (eg ‘a person without previous knowledge of the 
facts’) as it was under the 1956 Act. This suggests that the provision applies only 
57 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 104(5).
58 Ibid ch IV.
59 Ibid s 77(8).
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when nobody using reasonable inquiry can ascertain the author’s identity. Would 
this mean that it could not apply even when only the publisher of the work knew 
the author’s identity? This would set the bar very high indeed. On the other hand, 
the choice of the word ‘inquiry’ suggests that some kind of objective or external 
viewpoint is imagined, a viewpoint perhaps outside the relationships to which the 
author is party.
If the anonymous or pseudonymous author’s identity were not considered 
unascertainable, the originality of the unattributed work would not be presumed 
but would have to be proved. Therefore the act of authorship would have to be 
established, though whether this requires author identifi cation by name is another 
question. If it did, this would run counter to the continuing spirit of the Berne 
Convention and the age-old respect accorded to the anonymous author.
Again, the development of English law on this issue has something to say about 
Australian law.
D  The Australian Law
In Australia, the law in this area is currently regulated by the Copyright Act 1968
(Cth), which replaced the 1912 Act. The current Australian Act postdates the 1956 
UK Act and predates the 1988 UK Act. Like the UK statutes, the Australian Act 
does not allow for action to be taken on behalf of the anonymous or pseudonymous 
author. Author privacy therefore comes at a considerable cost and Australia does 
not appear to be compliant with any of the Acts of the Berne Convention in this 
respect.
The proof of fact provisions in Australia show similarities with those of the 1956 
UK Act. For example, in Australia the originality of the work is expressly made 
the subject of the presumption.60 Further, the Australian proof of fact provisions
use the words ‘anonymous’ and ‘pseudonymous’,61 which suggests that the 
presumptions will apply in cases where the lack of identifi cation is the result 
of an author’s choice. Australian legislators have not adopted the requirement 
of ‘unascertainable identity’ which would considerably narrow the scope of the 
provisions. In Australia, the presumptions apply where:
(a) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work has been published;
(b) the publication was anonymous or is alleged by the plaintiff to have 
been pseudonymous; and 
(c) it is not established that the work has ever been published under the 
true name of the author, or under a name by which he or she was 
commonly known, or that the identity of the author is generally known 
or can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry …62
60 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 129(1).
61 Ibid s 129(2).
62 Ibid.
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The concept of the ‘commonly known’ name is used (again, the nature of the 
relevant population segment by which commonality is to be assessed is not 
specifi ed). The presumption will not be available if the author can be identifi ed 
through ‘reasonable inquiry’. On their face, the provisions are more generous to 
the unidentifi ed author than their current UK counterpart.
On the other hand, the reference in the 1956 UK Act to ‘a person without previous 
knowledge of the facts’63 — as the hypothetical person exercising ‘reasonable 
inquiry’ into the author’s identity — is omitted. It would appear that Australian 
legislators did not wish to limit the category of persons who might engage in the 
‘reasonable inquiry’. Nevertheless, the concept that a person would be engaged 
in ‘inquiry’ at all may suggest, as mentioned above, that that person would, by 
defi nition, not have an inside or previous knowledge of the facts. The words 
‘without previous knowledge’ may merely have been considered otiose.
If one were to take the opposite view, and read the provision as alluding to 
the knowledge of any person at all (though presumably excluding that of the 
author), the result would be that a living author’s name could practically never be 
established as unknown. In the case of a deliberately anonymous or pseudonymous 
author the provision could rarely be relied on.
Once the presumption of originality is raised, the case can proceed until evidence 
establishes that the work is not original or that copyright does not subsist in it. 
Issues of authorship or lack thereof will be raised in evidence, as has occurred in 
the recent Australian cases. After all, a presumption is not proof. Nevertheless, 
considering that:
(1) the right to choose pseudonymity is one of the moral rights of the author in 
Australia;
(2) this choice of a pseudonym would be meaningless if the mask could not be 
retained through the litigation process;
(3) the Berne Convention requires its Member States to enable authors’ rights 
to be asserted in the absence of author identifi cation; and 
(4) the Berne Convention requires Member States to provide for representative 
actions in such a way that identity need not be revealed,
our courts should not endorse the proposition that author identifi cation (at least by 
name) can necessarily be called for when copyright subsistence is in issue. 
1  A Summary
In summary, the safeguards of authorial privacy furnished by the Australian 
Act are already inferior to the protection envisaged by the drafters of the 
Berne Convention and adopted as a binding obligation by Australia. Although 
pseudonymity is now expressly provided for and the copyright generated by the 
anonymous or pseudonymous author is protected for a substantial period of time, 
63 Copyright Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz 2, c 74 s 20(6).
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the proof of fact provisions in Australia, and also in the UK, are not consistent 
with the requirements of the Berne Convention. 
For one thing, they pertain only to the assertion of copyright (an economic right), 
while the Berne Convention provisions focus on the assertion of authors’ rights, 
including moral rights. 
Secondly, the Australian provisions, like their UK counterparts, do not appear 
to allow the assertion of rights on behalf of the anonymous author (and without 
divulgation of the author’s identity) even if that author is also a copyright 
owner. There is simply no mechanism that allows the exercise of rights in this 
circumstance. Yet this means of protecting the author’s privacy is and always has 
been fundamental to the Berne provisions.
Thirdly, there has been a narrowing of the proof of fact provisions in the UK, and 
perhaps Australia — depending on how our statute is read — which may prevent 
the provisions assisting in the maintenance of an author’s privacy even when the 
litigant is the copyright owner asserting the owner’s own rights. The conditions 
for the applicability of the presumptions have become increasingly onerous over 
the years.
It remains to be considered how the proof of fact provisions, together with the 
issue of author identifi cation as opposed to author privacy, have been treated in 
recent Australian cases.
V  AUSTRALIAN DECISIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Beyond the widespread calls for author identifi cation mentioned at the beginning 
of this article, the applicants in two recent Australian cases sought to rely on 
the proof of fact provisions to establish copyright in the absence of author 
identifi cation. Although author privacy was not at issue in either case, the general 
comments made by the courts about the use of the provisions are capable of broad, 
if inapposite, application.
A  Telstra v Phone Directories
In Phone Directories,64 the applicant adduced several pieces of evidence in an 
attempt to prove that the works were original authored material, created in the 
relevant way by its unnamed employees. Apparently as a fallback position, it 
attempted to rely on ss 128 and 129 (the latter of these directed to anonymous 
or pseudonymous works) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) on the basis that these 
64 (2010) 264 ALR 617.
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works appeared without any designation of authorship.65 This attempted reliance 
on the statutory presumptions did not assist the applicant because, as Gordon J 
pointed out, the evidence adduced by it rebutted the presumption on which it was 
seeking to rely.66
In interpreting the two sections, however, her Honour made a curious comment 
that:
s 129 [relating to anonymous and pseudonymous works] itself only gives
rise to a presumption of originality and the location of fi rst publication, not 
to the identity of the author or authors, or of subsistence of copyright in the
work: compare s 128 of the Copyright Act. For that reason the provision
has no relevance and may be put to one side.67
The comment seems to imply that the establishment (albeit provisional) of the 
work’s originality is secondary to the establishment of the author’s identity and 
to the establishment of copyright subsistence. But this is surely the reverse of the 
truth. The ‘identifi cation’ of the author must be subsidiary to the main question 
of whether original expression, hence authorship, has occurred. If authorship 
and an original work are correlatives, then to presume originality is to presume 
authorship.68
What Gordon J appears to mean, in the passage from which this is taken, is that 
the presumption can perhaps operate in the absence of an author’s name but that it 
cannot operate in the face of an already proven lack of authorship. In this particular 
case evidence of authorship had been adduced and had been found wanting, so it 
was reasonable to state that the presumption could not then be relied on. But that 
was an unusual case. The statement cannot be taken as suggesting that, simply 
because an author cannot be located or the person’s authorship established, the 
presumption does not apply and is irrelevant.
A further point made by Gordon J in dismissing the relevance of the proof of 
fact provisions is of particular interest to those concerned with the maintenance 
of the author’s privacy. Her Honour stated that in this case the authors were not 
to be considered anonymous or pseudonymous, with the result that s 129 would 
65 Section 128 provides that if the work is published and a publisher’s (but no author’s) name appears on 
the work it will be assumed that copyright subsists in the work and that the publisher is the copyright 
owner. Section 129 provides that, if a work is anonymous or pseudonymous, it will be presumed to be 
original and to have been created at a time and place which make it amenable to Australian copyright 
law.
66 Likewise, when the case went on appeal to the Full Federal Court, Perram J was of the opinion that the 
presumption in s 128 was not of a kind which would ‘compete with actual evidence’ in such a way that 
reliance on it would preclude the adducing of evidence: Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co 
Pty Ltd (2010) 194 FCR 142, 180 [123]–[124]. The evidence adduced by the appellant was taken into
account by his Honour as disproving the fact on which the operation of the presumption pivoted. 
67 Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 631–2 [42] (emphasis added).
68 On this question, see David Lindsay, ‘Protection of Compilations and Databases after IceTV: Authorship, 
Originality and the Transformation of Australian Copyright Law’ (2012) 38(1) Monash University Law 
Review 17, 44 noting that the shift in primary emphasis from originality to authorship occurred as a 
result of IceTV.
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not apply.69 This was despite the fact that there was no author designation. The 
judge may have been indicating here that, in the proven absence of authorship, 
it is idle to talk of anonymity. Or she may have been raising a question already 
raised by the new formulation of the proof of fact provisions in the UK,70 and 
distinguishing between the type of anonymity that is chosen by the author and 
the systemic failure to either record or disclose authorship that one fi nds in large 
organisations. If it is true that the latter type of failure to disclose authorship 
does not constitute anonymity, it might be usefully raised to drive home the fact 
that, if an organisation fails to fulfi l its obligation to respect the authors’ moral 
right of attribution, the organisation cannot rely on whatever benefi ts fl ow from 
the statutory presumptions. On the other hand, if the author chose to remain 
unnamed, the statutory presumptions might retain their operation.
B  Fairfax v Reed
The case of Fairfax v Reed71 concerned articles published in the Australian
Financial Review newspaper and their titles, and raised questions of whether 
each of the claimed ‘works’, some of which were unattributed, had been authored 
in the relevant way. Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd, which had been either 
unable or unwilling to identify the authors of the ‘works’, attempted to rely on 
the presumptions relating to anonymous works. However, Bennett J declined to 
apply the presumptions.72 Her Honour’s reasons focused on the type of inquiry
that needed to be undertaken in order to establish whether the authorship was 
anonymous, and hence whether the presumption could assist the applicant.73 Such
questions had been covered by the equivalent provision, s 20(6), in the 1956 UK 
Copyright Act.
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd had submitted that ‘reasonable inquiry’ 
in s 129 (of the type which might yield relevant information as to the author’s 
identity) had, or would have, failed, thus bringing the presumption into play.74 It 
argued that the concept ‘should be construed to mean reasonable inquiry external 
to the author or his or her employer’75 — in other words, an inquiry by a ‘third 
party’. This argument was apparently inspired by the 1956 UK Copyright Act. 
However, Bennett J rejected this contention, due to the absence of any such 
express limitation in the Australian provision’s wording.76
69 Phone Directories (2010) 264 ALR 617, 631–2 [42].
70 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) c 48, s 104(5).
71 (2010) 189 FCR 109.
72 Ibid 129 [79].
73 Ibid 129–30 [80].
74 Ibid 129 [77].
75 Ibid (emphasis added).
76 Ibid 129 [79]: ‘There are no additional words in s 129(2) that provide that the test becomes whether 
the identity of the author can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry “external to the author or their 
employer”’.
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Despite this judicial disapproval it is arguable, as noted above, that reasonable 
‘inquiry’ must imply inquiry by a person external to the author and in most 
cases external to the employer. The author or, generally, the employer (the person 
who has instigated the work) would hardly be engaged in an ‘inquiry’ as to the 
author’s identity. This is all the more so since the knowledge of other employees 
of the employer — those who had worked closely with the author — would be 
attributable to the employer itself on normal principles. There would be no need 
for ‘inquiry’ within this relationship.
What is more persuasive against the use of the statutory presumptions in Fairfax
v Reed is that there appears to have been an element of laxity or complacency by
the employer/legal team. For reasons that remained unclear, no attempt had been 
made to compile the information which would have been relevant to the use of 
the presumptions and to which the authors would presumably not have objected.77
More worryingly, Bennett J further noted that s 129(2) ‘cannot be intended to 
address the situation where the source of the work and the authors are evident to or 
available to be ascertained by the employer but the employer claiming copyright 
decides not to identify the precise authors’.78 Applied to the facts in issue, the 
statement is understandable. But, like a number of statements in these judgments, 
if it is accepted as a generally applicable pronouncement there is a danger that 
it will undermine the principles on which our copyright law is built. Should an 
author not wish to be identifi ed by name, and should he or she express this to the 
employer, there is no principle of law that identifi cation should be forced upon 
the author and no reason why the statutory presumption should not apply. The 
presumptions enshrined in the Berne Convention were always intended to apply 
to a situation where the author had requested the copyright owner to respect his 
or her desire not to be named.
C  Later Developments and the Need to Distinguish between
Author and Authorship
In summary, there has been much in recent judgments to cause concern to those who 
value the manner in which copyright legislation can offer privacy protection. Side 
by side with the consistent and broadly stated assertion that author identifi cation 
is necessary to the establishment of copyright protection, the courts have also 
declined — sometimes for reasons that are stated in excessively sweeping terms 
— to allow the statutory presumptions to be used by the plaintiff/claimant.
Nevertheless, it does appear that some judges have stepped back from demanding 
author identifi cation as a precondition to fi nding originality. For example, in obiter 
dicta, Bennett J in Fairfax v Reed gave a more nuanced view of what needed to
be established:
77 Ibid: ‘Fairfax has chosen not to identify the authors. The onus does not shift to Reed to identify those 
authors, failing which Fairfax will be entitled to the benefi t of a presumption that its works are original’.
78 Ibid 130 [80].
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I am not persuaded that, where evidence establishes a work of joint 
authorship, the authors are identifi ed as Fairfax employees holding 
specifi ed job descriptions and the skill and labour involved in those job 
descriptions are identifi ed, it is fatal to a claim of copyright that each 
person making contributions to the contended works is not identifi ed.79
Apparently some sort of description of the authors by reference to their role in the 
organisation might have been enough. How precise such a description would need 
to be is unclear but it does seem that it would not be suffi cient merely to allude 
to the existence of such employees. It is not clear that the degree of identifi cation 
which her Honour had in mind falls far short of an identifi cation by name.
This moderation of the demands for author identifi cation has been repeated by 
two judges of the Full Federal Court, deciding the appeal in Telstra Corporation 
Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd.80 While Gordon J’s overall decision was 
upheld, Keane CJ endorsed the appellant’s objection to the proposition that all the 
authors (if such authors existed) must be identifi ed:
One may accept that identifi cation by name of each and every author is 
not necessary in order to make out a claim that copyright subsists under 
s 32(2)(c): what is necessary, however, is that it be shown that the work in 
question originates from an individual author or authors.81
In other words it was authorship rather than an author which needed to be identifi ed 
in order to establish the subsistence of copyright. Perram J took a similar view, 
indicating that he did not understand the trial judge to have insisted on the naming 
of authors, but rather on the demonstration that such authors existed.82 In any
event, his Honour stated:
I would not accept that it is necessary to identify each author … all that 
needs to be demonstrated is that such persons exist. Their identifi cation is 
not legally required by the concept of an original work.83
As for the High Court comment that had set off the wave of calls for author 
identifi cation, Perram J regarded it as ‘a counsel of wisdom rather than a legal 
stipulation’.84
It is to be hoped that generalised calls for the identifi cation of the author will 
cease, and emphasis will instead be put on the establishment of authorship (albeit 
by individuals) on the balance of probabilities in order to establish copyright. 
Likewise the operation of s 128 should not be expressed to depend on the 
‘identifi cation’ of authors and their particular contribution to the work. 
79 Ibid 131 [89].
80 (2010) 194 FCR 142.
81 Ibid 162 [57].
82 Ibid 181 [127].
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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The High Court has refused to hear an appeal in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone 
Directories Co Pty Ltd, 85 so it appears that it is content to leave the last word with 
the judges of the Full Federal Court. But one cannot help feeling that a great deal 
of confusion would have been avoided if the courts had, from the outset, made a 
distinction between authorship (which, if it exists, can frequently be established 
on balance without any identifi cation of persons) and the author. ‘Authorship’, 
like its correlative ‘originality’, is required for copyright subsistence and must be 
established to a suffi ciently high level of probability. But, to a signifi cant extent, 
our statutory scheme is designed to function without an identifi ed ‘author’.
The point where the greatest diffi culty arose among the recent cases was in 
Primary Health Care,86 where it was genuinely unknown who the alleged authors 
of the alleged joint works (medical records) were, what contribution they had 
made to the ‘works’ in question and whether they were ‘qualifi ed persons’ at the 
relevant time. It was quite possible here that no Australian copyright material 
existed at all due to the material being no more than an aggregation of factual 
statements by different and unknown persons; the evidence was insuffi cient for a 
case to be made on the balance of probabilities. Even had the presumptions been 
activated, they would not have been able to withstand a challenge. In that case 
authorship of a copyright work could not be established. 
But the fact that identifying an author can solve an evidential problem is not 
to say that the establishment of author identity must be looked for as a fi rst or 
automatic step, in the way suggested in some of the judgments discussed in this 
article. In the situation where it is not even certain that a work exists at all, if the 
‘authors’ can be produced, well and good. If they cannot, or do not wish to be 
identifi ed, the standard of proof will simply not be met unless other witnesses 
can attest to their existence and input. This is not overly hard on the copyright 
claimant. Indeed one could expect the copyright claimant — a publisher, perhaps, 
or an employer — to be able to act as such a witness without the need for author 
identifi cation. Likewise, the presumption of s 128 should stand until the basis for 
that presumption is overturned by evidence.
VI  CONCLUSION
The protection of authors’ privacy through the copyright regimes has a long 
history and has been fortifi ed recently with the incorporation of the moral right 
of attribution in our statutes. If authors are to have an express right to mask their 
identity with a pseudonym, then the law needs to support that choice in its other 
provisions and in the interpretation of those provisions. The courts need to be 
mindful of this aspect of the copyright regime when considering such fundamental 
matters as the requirements for copyright subsistence. As they frequently remind 
us, the legislative regime is centred on the author and this requires due attention 
85 Transcript of Proceedings, Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2011] HCATrans 
248 (2 September 2011).  
86 (2010) 186 FCR 301.
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to be given to author preferences. Despite this, the protection of the author’s 
privacy though copyright legislation in Australia is signifi cantly less robust 
than is required by the Berne Convention. Representative actions on behalf of 
the deliberately unnamed author appear to be impossible. The ‘proof of fact’ 
provisions are, in this area, much less effective than they were intended by the 
Berne drafters to be. In the UK they are even showing an evolution away from 
their role of allowing authorial masking; in Australia they tend to be cast aside. 
In light of the existence of moral rights and the history of the proof of fact 
provisions, we must be careful not to allow unjustifi ed slippages to occur in judicial 
formulations of the requirements for copyright subsistence. It is important that we 
regularly remind ourselves of the humanism that informed both the introduction 
of the moral rights to the Berne Convention and the solicitude for author privacy 
that contributed to the form of the Berne proof of fact provisions. In fact, in this 
digital age when privacy and anonymity are often disregarded and where the 
desire for them can sometimes seem quaint, we may need to be more vigilant than 
ever to ensure their continued protection.
